What is Project Teton?

Project Teton is a verifiable compute layer for Solana. It binds Ed25519 signing keys to hardware-isolated enclaves so a protocol can prove that a signature came from measured code on attested silicon.

Private keys are generated inside CPU-encrypted memory. The host operating system and a human operator cannot extract them. Signatures execute only under an attested binary measurement.

Value proposition

Project Teton eliminates hot-key compromise for high-throughput DeFi, tokenized real-world assets, institutional custody, and decentralized oracles.

Deliverable	Role
On-chain verifier	AMD VCEK / P-384, Google JWT, AWS Nitro COSE Sign1
Policy and replay	Measurement allowlist, SlotHashes freshness, `UsedNonceAccount`
Client SDKs	Rust `teton-sdk`, TypeScript `@the-ruby-group/teton`, CPI helpers
Enclave runtime	`teton-sidecar` daemon, `teton-cli`, Docker image
Documentation	This portal (`@spec TETON-DOCS-001`)

Hardware trust roots

Teton verifies two silicon roots:

Root	Platform	Attestation
AMD SEV-SNP	GCE Confidential VM	1,184-byte report, ECDSA P-384, `ARK → ASK → VCEK`
AWS Nitro Enclaves	Nitro parent + EIF	COSE Sign1 / CBOR, ECDSA P-384, AWS Nitro Root CA

Google Confidential Space adds an OIDC JWT (verify_google_jwt) that binds eat_nonce and image_digest to the same Mode A / Mode B session model.

See the threat model for isolation boundaries.

Dual modality

Mode	Instruction	Consumer cost after attest
A — Stateful	`verify_and_register`	Native Ed25519. PDA check ≤ 1,500 CUs. P-384 runs once per session.
B — Atomic	`verify_atomic_with_nonce`	One transaction. Header is 80 bytes on the wire. Nonce PDA blocks replay.

Mode A TTL is ATTESTATION_TTL_SLOTS = 216_000 (~24 hours at 400 ms). Details: Mode A and Mode B.

Live program

Item	Value
Program id	`EKfHCTnsbRQfURsdmzkmuoxUx7DVt8WsQ5X7t49ZZZh`
Crates	`teton-verifier`, `teton-cpi` (`declare_id` matches)
Cluster	Solana Devnet
Compile target	SBPFv3 (`e_flags = 0x3`, `@spec TETON-DEPLOY-001`)

Stage 2 attestation stays under 550,000 CUs (@spec TETON-PERF-001, TETON-PERF-002).

Workspace map

Path	Purpose
`programs/teton-verifier`	On-chain verifier
`crates/teton-core`	`no_std` report types
`crates/teton-crypto`	P-384, VCEK, JWT, Nitro CBOR
`crates/teton-cpi`	Consumer helpers
`crates/teton-sdk`	Rust builders
`sdks/typescript`	`@the-ruby-group/teton`
`bins/teton-sidecar`	In-enclave daemon
`bins/teton-cli`	Proof-of-enclave CLI

Next steps

Read the threat model.
Pick Mode A or Mode B.
Wire Rust CPI or the TypeScript SDK.
Run the sidecar inside the enclave.